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FORWARD 
This is a standard published by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) that is intended to provide uniform structural 
design and factor of safety requirements in support of the development of human-rated 
spaceflight hardware. The material covered in this standard is based on the consensus 
judgment of a working group of structural engineers supporting the NASA JSC 
Structural Engineering Division, and founded on agency-wide consensus positions 
developed under the Constellation Program and lessons learned by the Space Shuttle 
Program’s Structures Working Group.  
The technical content of this standard is primarily based on the Constellation Program 
Structural Design and Verification Requirements (SDVR) document, CxP 70135 
Change 004. It incorporates lessons learned from implementation of the SDVR within 
the CxP Orion and Ares projects, which highlighted a number of issues. The goal in 
writing this new standard was to maintain intent of the original requirement while 
reorganizing the content to improve document structure, clarify intent or remove 
redundancy. In some cases, requirements were removed because they are addressed 
in other standards being released concurrently, for example the new standard for 
fasteners and mechanical joints. In addition, detailed rationale statements were added 
for each requirement to provide guidance on interpretation and, in some cases, a 
discussion of the recommended verification method. 
This standard focuses on design and factor of safety requirements. Details related to 
methods of verification of each requirement will be negotiated and approved via the 
structural verification plan submitted to the Technical Authority at the responsible NASA 
center for review and approval. 
This standard was compiled with contributions from Rod Kujala/JSC, Karen 
Bernstein/JSC, Vince Fogt/JSC and Paul Romine/JSC. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURPOSE 
This document establishes the structural requirements for human-rated spaceflight 
hardware including launch vehicles, spacecraft and payloads. These requirements are 
applicable to Government Furnished Equipment activities as well as all related 
contractor, subcontractor and commercial efforts. These requirements are not imposed 
on systems other than human-rated spacecraft, such as ground test articles, but may be 
tailored for use in specific cases where it is prudent to do so such as for personnel 
safety or when assets are at risk.  
The requirements in this document are focused on design rather than verification. 
Implementation of the requirements is expected to be described in a Structural 
Verification Plan (SVP), which should describe the verification of each structural item for 
the applicable requirements. The SVP may also document unique verifications that 
meet or exceed these requirements with NASA Technical Authority approval. 
1.2 APPLICABILITY 
This document recommends engineering practices for NASA programs and projects. It 
may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical 
requirement. 
Determining the suitability of this standard and its provisions is the responsibility of 
program/project management and the performing organization. This standard is 
applicable to the development of new hardware. Applicability to existing hardware with 
previous flight history will be addressed in the program Systems Requirements 
Document (SRD). Project-specific tailoring may generate other project-specific 
requirements that are derivatives of this standard.  
Other program standards such as International Space Station (ISS) requirements may 
also be applicable. For ISS specific events refer to the SSP 50808, International Space 
Station (ISS) to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Interface 
Requirements Document (IRD).   
The requirements specifically excluded from this standard are materials and processes, 
design loads determination, fracture control, glass, fasteners, liquid propulsion engines 
greater than 6000 lbs thrust, ISS specific events, ground support equipment and 
facilities. Appropriate standards should be used for these topics, as applicable. 
The scope of this document is to define the structural design requirements for primary 
and secondary structures sometimes also called safety critical structures. 
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1.3 IMPLEMENTATION 
The convention used in this document to distinguish between requirements and goals is 
as follows: “shall” is used to indicate requirements that must be implemented and 
verified, and “should” is used to indicate goals that must be addressed by the design but 
do not need to be verified. Each “shall” requirement is contained in its own subsection 
and indicated with a unique number using the format: [STRxxxx] for traceability 
purposes. 
The purpose of the Rationale statement is to indicate why the requirement is needed, 
the basis for its inclusion in a requirements document, and to provide context and 
examples to stakeholders. It is important to note that the rationales are not binding and 
only provide supporting information. 
1.3.1 Tailoring 
The responsible NASA Center will charter a Loads and Structures Panel (LSP) for 
reviewing and approving the implementation of the requirements of this document. The 
LSP is the responsible NASA Technical Authority for the program for structural design 
requirements. 
In the event that a particular requirement of this document cannot be met for a specific 
component, alternative tailored requirements may be proposed. Tailored requirements 
must be demonstrated to be “risk neutral” per the program risk assessment process. 
Risk neutral approaches have equivalent risk to the requirements in this document. The 
approach will be approved by the NASA LSP and documented in the SVP.  
1.4 CONSTRAINTS AND PRECONDITIONS 
The criteria of this document were developed in the context of structural designs that 
are amenable to engineering analyses by current state-of-the-art methods and 
conforming to standard aerospace industry practices. More specifically, the designs are 
assumed to use materials having mechanical properties that are well characterized for 
the intended service environments and all design conditions. For reusable and multi-
mission hardware, these criteria are applicable throughout the service life and all of the 
missions. 
Design considerations should include material property degradation under the service 
environments. Material allowables should be chosen to minimize the probability of 
structural failure due to material variability. Allowables should be based on sufficient 
material tests to establish values on a statistical basis. Further, the service 
environments and limit loads should be well defined. Aerospace standard manufacturing 
and process controls should be used in hardware fabrication and handling. Test 
hardware should be representative of the flight configuration. 
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2 DOCUMENTS 
The documents listed as applicable documents contain provisions that constitute 
requirements of this standard as cited in the text of Section 3. Reference documents are 
provided for additional information or to provide guidance to meet the requirements in 
Section 3 but are not levied as requirements. 
The applicable documents are accessible via the NASA Technical Standards System at 
http://standards.nasa.gov or may be obtained directly from the Standards Developing 
Organizations or other document distributors. 
2.1 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
ANSI/AIAA S-080-1998 Space Systems - Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized 
Structures, and Pressure Components, September 13, 1999 
ANSI/AIAA S-081A-2006 Space Systems - Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 
(COPVs), July 24, 2006 
JSC 65829 Loads and Structural Dynamics Requirements for Spaceflight 
Hardware 
JSC 65830, rev. 2 Interim Requirements and Standard Practices for Mechanical 
Joints with Threaded Fasteners in Spaceflight Hardware 
NASA-STD-5019 Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware 
NASA-STD-5012 Strength and Life Assessment Requirements for Liquid 
Fueled Space Propulsion System Engines, Baseline, June 
13, 2006 
2.2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
AIAA S-110-2005 Space Systems – Structures, Structural Components, and 
Structural Assemblies, July 12, 2005 
DOT/FAA/AR-MMPDS-01 Metallic Materials Properties Development and 
Standardization, January 2003 
JSC 19652 Instructions for the preparation of Stress Analysis Reports, 
Revision A, September 1987 
MIL-DTL-83420M Wire Rope, Flexible, for Aircraft Control, General 
Specification for, w/ Amendment 1, February 17, 2009 
MSFC-DWG-20M02540 Assessment of Flexible Lines for Flow Induced Vibration, 
Revision E, Jan 15, 1992  
MSFC-SPEC-626 Test Control Document for Assessment of Flexible Lines for 
Flow Induced Vibration, February 28, 1990 
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MIL-HDBK-17-2 Composite Materials Handbook Volume 2, Polymer Matrix 
Composites Materials Properties, Revision F, June 17, 2002 
MIL-HDBK-17-4 Composite Materials Handbook Volume 4, Metal Matrix 
Composites, Revision A, June 17, 2002 
MIL-HDBK-17-5 Composite Materials Handbook Volume 5, Ceramic Matrix 
Composites, June 17, 2002 
NASA SP-8007 Buckling of Thin-Walled Circular Cylinders, September 1965 
NASA-STD-5018 Strength Design and Verification Criteria for Glass, Ceramics 
and Windows in Human Space Flight Applications, 
September 2006 
NASA-STD-5020 Requirements and Standard Practices for Mechanical Joints 
with Threaded Fasteners in Spaceflight Hardware 
NASA-STD-6016 Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for 
Spacecraft, Baseline, July 11, 2008 
NASA-TM-X-73305 Astronautic Structures Manual, August 1975 
NSTS 08123 Certification of Flex Hoses and Bellows for Flow Induced 
Vibration, Revision C, April 12, 1994 
NSTS/ISS 18798 Interpretations of NSTS/ISS Payload Safety Requirements, 
Revision B, September 1997 
NWC TP 6575 Parachute Recovery Systems Design Manual, March 1991 
SMC-S-005 Space and Missile Systems Center Standard, Space 
Systems – Flight Pressurized Systems, June 3, 2009 
SSP 50808 International Space Station (ISS) to Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services (COTS) Interface Requirements 
Document (IRD), Revision A, May 9, 2008. 
2.3 ORDER OF PRECEDENCE 
This document establishes requirements for structural design and test factors but these 
factors do not supersede or waive established Agency requirements found in other 
documentation. Conflicts between this standard and other requirements documents will 
be resolved by the NASA Technical Authority. 
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3 STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
3.1.1 Structural Verification Plan 
[STR0001] The organization responsible for structural design shall develop and 
maintain a comprehensive Structural Verification Plan (SVP) that documents the full 
structural analysis, test, and assessment program for approval by the NASA Technical 
Authority. 
Rationale:
1.4
  The purpose of this plan is to establish an understanding and 
agreement between the organization responsible for structural design and the 
NASA Technical Authority. The SVP development, negotiation and approval 
process serves as the means to tailor the design requirements for their unique 
application to each design and organization, ensuring the meet-or-exceed 
implementation of the requirements as described in Section . 
A comprehensive SVP specifies how the design requirements of this document 
will be met and verified. It demonstrates that the organization responsible for 
design and development understands all relevant requirements and has 
implemented them in a consistent and integrated manner. The SVP will identify 
the analyses, tests, inspections, demonstrations or appropriate combinations of 
these that comprise verification of the requirements in this document.  
The content and format of the SVP is not formally defined; however the 
document should include the following as a minimum; 
a. A requirements applicability matrix that identifies which requirements are 
applicable to the system or hardware being delivered and rationale for 
exclusion if not levied. 
b. A list of applicable requirements documents. 
c. A brief description and sketches of hardware primary and secondary 
structure.   
d. The proposed method for verification of the primary and secondary structure 
items. Include proposed factors of safety, stress analysis methodology (i.e., 
hand or computer analysis), verification approach for the analytical models 
that will be used for stress calculations, and the proposed strength testing. 
Rationale must be provided if no strength testing is planned. 
e. Description of special materials (e.g., composites, beryllium, and glass) and 
the corresponding special measures which will be taken to verify their 
strength according to the requirements of this or other applicable 
requirements documents 
f. Brief description of the source of material allowables which will be used for 
the strength analysis for each primary and secondary structure item. 
g. Specific implementation of fastener and preloaded joint requirements as 
defined in JSC 65830, rev. 2. 
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h. Derivation of design loads for primary structure, secondary structure, and 
components or experiments as described in JSC 65829. 
i. Proposed method for dynamic math model verification of the primary and 
significant secondary structural hardware as defined in JSC 65829. Rationale 
must be provided if no dynamic testing is planned. 
j. Summary and schedule of all loads and stress analyses, planned tests 
(includes strength, pressure, dynamic, random vibration, and acoustic tests), 
and math model correlation activities as described in this document and other 
relevant specifications. 
The initial delivery of the SVP should be at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR). 
The fidelity at PDR should be detailed enough to define the structural verification 
approach including planned development testing. The SVP must be maintained 
and updated because the hardware design and the design data will evolve as the 
data such as loads, mass properties, temperatures and other environments are 
verified. The SVP should be updated between PDR and CDR to support these 
evolutions and to update the structural verification approach, as needed. By 
CDR, the SVP should be finalized and approved by the NASA Technical 
Authority. 
It is probable that the design database will mature after Critical Design Review 
(CDR), and design changes will need to be considered in response to these 
developments. The organization responsible for structural design will need to 
establish a program to evaluate how post-CDR changes in the natural and 
induced environments may affect the hardware and the type of document 
updates that will be provided. 
3.1.2 Stress Analysis 
[STR0002] Design stress analysis reports, including a margin of safety summary table 
and an indentured parts list, shall be prepared in accordance with standard aerospace 
industry practices for flight hardware and available for review by the NASA Technical 
Authority. 
Rationale
The margin of safety summary table shows the minimum margin of safety for the 
flight vehicle or element structure, the critical condition or mode of failure and the 
critical load for the flight vehicle or element structure.  
: The stress analysis report will document analysis results and 
conclusions. The purpose of the stress analysis report is to verify the capability of 
the respective flight hardware to meet the design requirements specified in this 
document. At a minimum, content similar to that summarized in JSC 19652, 
Instructions for the preparation of Stress Analysis Reports, should be included. 
An indentured parts list identifies each and every part of the vehicle. If parts are 
non-structural or acceptable by inspection, the summary should state so. If a part 
is accepted by similarity to other parts, the summary table should indicate this 
clearly. 
    JSC 65828 
Rev. A 
 
This document represents the technical consensus of the 
developing group but does not yet have final NASA approval. 
 
 11 
Stress analysis reports are typically prepared in support of the following four 
design reviews: Preliminary Design Review (PDR); Critical Design Review 
(CDR); Design Certification Review (DCR); and Flight Readiness Review (FRR). 
3.1.3 Structural Test Plans 
[STR0003] A test plan showing the proposed loading conditions, structural configuration 
to be tested, and method of test, including load application and instrumentation, shall be 
prepared and submitted to the NASA Technical Authority for each unique structural test. 
Rationale: The SVP should describe the structural tests that will be performed 
and identify which test plans will be submitted to the NASA Technical Authority. 
Test plans for qualification tests, proof tests and model verification are generally 
covered by this requirement.  
The test plan includes a summary of the objectives of the test, a description of 
the test article configuration including locations of instrumentation, a description 
of the test boundary conditions, a summary of the applied loads and their method 
of application, a summary of projected internal loads and the stresses and forces 
compared to predicted flight conditions. 
3.1.4 Structural Test Reports 
[STR0004] A test report showing the results of each unique structural test shall be 
prepared and submitted to the NASA Technical Authority. 
Rationale
3.2 STRUCTURAL DESIGN  
: The test report includes stresses and forces developed during test and 
a summary of test data which is applicable to the structural verification. The 
report should also include a comparison of the test results to the analysis of the 
test configuration, demonstrating that the test objectives were met. 
Structures are components and assemblies designed to sustain loads or pressures, 
provide stiffness and stability, or provide support or containment. Internal components 
are excluded if their failure would not result in a critical or catastrophic hazard. 
3.2.1 Structural Strength  
3.2.1.1 Ultimate Structural Strength 
[STR0005] Flight hardware structure shall maintain structural integrity with +0.00 or 
positive Margin(s) of Safety (MS) when exposed to limit loads multiplied by ultimate 
factors of safety during the service life, including the effect of aging on the hardware. 
Rationale: Structural integrity is lost when the structure can no longer maintain its 
load-carrying capacity. 
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Limit loads multiplied by ultimate factors of safety are sometimes called “ultimate 
loads”. 
Aging is intended to account for degradation of mechanical properties due to 
service life environments, such as potential structural erosion caused by plasma 
environmental effects, atomic oxygen, and other natural environments, during the 
design life. 
Factor of safety requirements are contained in Section 3.3.1. 
A definition of service life is provided in Section B. 
3.2.1.2 Detrimental Deformation 
[STR0006] Flight hardware structure shall have no detrimental deformation when 
exposed to limit loads multiplied by yield factors of safety during its service life. 
Rationale
a. Causes unintentional contact, misalignment, or divergence between 
adjacent components  
:  Detrimental deformation is structural deformation, deflection, or 
displacement which causes any of the following: 
b. Causes significant internal load redistribution in a structure  
c. Causes a component to exceed the dynamic space envelop established 
for that component  
d. Reduces the strength or rated life of the structure below specified levels 
e. Degrades the effectiveness of thermal protection coatings or shields  
f. Jeopardizes the proper functioning of equipment  
g. Endangers personnel  
h. Degrades the aerodynamic or functional characteristics of the vehicle  
i. Reduces confidence below acceptable levels in the ability to ensure flight-
worthiness by use of established analytical or test techniques  
j. Induces leakage above specified rates 
Protoflight hardware structure will have no detrimental deformation when 
exposed to acceptance or proof test loads. 
3.2.1.3 Yielding during Ground Transportation 
[STR0007] Flight hardware structure shall not yield when exposed to ground limit loads 
multiplied by yield factors of safety during ground transportation, rollout or handling 
operations. 
Rationale: Yielding of the hardware during transportation could damage the 
structure, rendering the service life inadequate. Loads during ground 
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transportation should be limited to avoid any damage, including non-detrimental 
yielding.  
3.2.1.4 Yield Margins of Safety 
[STR0008] Flight hardware structure shall have +0.00 or positive Margin(s) of Safety 
(MS) for all yield design load conditions, including the effect of aging on the hardware, 
except for cases of non-detrimental deformation.  
Rationale
In certain cases, yielding of structure may be acceptable if all of the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
: Structural yield margins of safety need to be assessed for all cases 
where material yield is detrimental. 
a. The structural integrity of the component should be demonstrated by 
adequate analysis and/or test. 
b. The service life requirements are met. 
c. The load case is not related to any ground handling or transport conditions. 
Unless otherwise specified, hydraulic, electrical, and other systems are not 
required to operate at loads and related deformations in excess of limit load. 
3.2.2 Buckling and Crippling 
3.2.2.1 Buckling and Crippling Analysis 
[STR0009] Design analyses of thin walled shell structures subject to buckling load 
conditions during the service life shall account for the differences between idealized 
model geometry and the physical structure. 
Rationale
Evaluations of buckling conditions should consider the combined action of 
primary and secondary stresses and their effects on general instability, local or 
panel instability, and crippling. 
: Discrepancies between analytically and empirically derived buckling 
load capability are due in part to the differences between idealized model 
geometry and the physical structure. “Knockdown factors” (correlation 
coefficients) are used to adjust predicted values to account for the differences. 
Typical knockdown factors for thin walled circular cylinders are listed in NASA 
SP-8007, Buckling of Thin-Walled Circular Cylinders. 
3.2.2.2 Structural Members Subject to Instability 
[STR0010] Flight hardware structure shall not collapse due to buckling when exposed 
to limit loads multiplied by ultimate factors of safety during the service life. 
Rationale:  All structural components that are subject to compressive and/or in-
plane shear stresses under any combination of ground loads, flight loads, or 
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loads resulting from temperature changes need to consider buckling failure 
modes. 
Evaluation of buckling conditions should consider the combined action of primary 
and secondary stresses and their effects on general instability, local or panel 
instability and crippling. 
3.2.2.3 Deformation Due to Buckling 
[STR0011] Flight hardware structure shall not deform in any manner that degrades the 
function of the structure or produces unaccounted for changes in loading due to 
buckling when limit loads are applied unless the structure was designed to crush during 
the load event.  
Rationale
Evaluations of buckling conditions should consider the combined action of 
primary and secondary stresses and their effects on general instability, local or 
panel instability, and crippling. 
: All structural components that are subject to compressive or in-plane 
shear stresses under any combination of ground loads, flight loads, or loads 
resulting from temperature changes need to consider buckling failure modes.  
Structures designed to crush may only collapse during the event for which the 
design intended. 
3.2.3 Structural Life 
3.2.3.1 Fatigue Life 
[STR0012] Flight hardware structure shall have a minimum fatigue life of 4.0 times the 
service life. 
Rationale
Methods used for load spectra development applicable to general flight structure 
are defined in JSC 65829, Loads and Structural Dynamics Requirements for 
Spaceflight Hardware. 
: Flight hardware structure design should preclude failure resulting from 
cumulative damage due to cyclic or repeated loading and sustained stress. 
The design assessment should consider all relevant load cycles over the service 
life as well as self-induced conditions due to operation.  
Fatigue life may be evaluated using a suitable method such as Miner’s Method 
unless covered by fracture control. 
3.2.3.2 High-Cycle Fatigue Life 
[STR0013] Flight hardware structure subjected to high-cycle fatigue shall have a 
minimum fatigue life of 10.0 times the service life. 
Rationale B: The definition of high-cycle fatigue is included Section . A definition 
of low-cycle fatigue is also provided for comparison. 
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3.2.3.3 Creep Avoidance 
[STR0014] All flight hardware structure shall be designed to preclude cumulative strain 
as a function of time (i.e., creep), which could result in rupture, detrimental deformation, 
or collapse (e.g., buckling) of compression members during the service life. 
Rationale
If selection of a structural material which exhibits creep phenomena in the flight 
hardware service environment is unavoidable, then approval of the NASA 
Technical Authority is required prior to use.  
: Materials are to be selected to preclude accumulated damage from 
creep in the flight hardware environment. 
Details of the material selection and method of creep assessment should be 
included in the SVP.  
3.2.3.4 Creep Life 
[STR0015] Flight hardware structure shall have adequate structural life with a creep life 
of 4.0 times the service life. 
Rationale
Details of the material selection and method of creep assessment should be 
included in the SVP. 
: Flight hardware design should preclude accumulated damage from 
creep in the service life environment. 
Creep life may be evaluated using a suitable method such as Time-Fraction Rule 
to determine total damage. 
3.2.4 Metallic Structures 
Factor of safety requirements for metallic flight structures are contained in Section 
3.3.1.2. Specific requirements for beryllium structures are provided in Section 3.3.1.2.1. 
3.2.5 Non-Metallic Structures 
Factor of safety requirements for non-metallic flight structures are contained in Section 
3.3.1.3. Requirements for soft goods and their factors of safety are included in Sections 
3.2.6 and 3.3.1.4 respectively. This document does not cover glass requirements, which 
are contained in NASA-STD-5018, Strength Design and Verification Criteria for Glass, 
Ceramics and Windows in Human Space Flight Applications. 
3.2.5.1 General Design Requirements for Composite/Bonded Structures 
[STR0016] Structural integrity of all composite and bonded flight structure, including 
bonded joints, shall be verified by testing that takes into account exposure to worst-case 
environmental conditions during the service life. 
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Rationale
Acceptance proof test loads should not exceed 80 percent of the composite 
material ultimate strength.  
: Composite components are to be subjected to qualification and 
acceptance proof testing. Qualification testing is performed to ensure adequate 
design strength. Proof testing is to ensure flight component quality and integrity. 
Testing may be accomplished at the flight component or subassembly level if the 
loads on the flight component or sub-assembly envelope those in a fully 
assembled test article. Testing of fracture critical parts may be accomplished in 
conjunction with residual strength verification tests of damaged and flawed 
components per NASA-STD-5019, Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight 
Hardware to the appropriate test factors. 
Details of the testing, including any rationale to exclude certain tests, should be 
defined in the SVP. 
3.2.5.2 Composites/Bonded Structure Design and Analysis Practices 
[STR0017] The designer/manufacturer shall use only manufacturing processes and 
controls (coupon tests, sampling techniques, building block approach, etc.) and design 
standards and analysis practices that are demonstrated to be reliable and consistent 
with established aerospace industry practices for composite/bonded structures. 
Rationale
The intent of this requirement is to address geometry, size scale effects and 
other development uncertainties. 
: The process dependent nature of composite materials necessitates 
reliance on well established design and fabrication standards as well as 
process/quality control procedures. This helps to ensure adequate final flight 
component design and quality. 
3.2.5.3 Composite Structure Inadvertent Damage Protection 
[STR0018] A plan to minimize inadvertent damage to manufactured composite 
structural components that may result from handling, transportation, storage or final 
assembly shall be prepared by the hardware developer. 
Rationale
3.2.6 Structural Soft Goods 
: Inherent susceptibility of composite materials to damage necessitates 
well defined handling, transportation, storage or final assembly procedures.   
Factor of safety requirements for structural soft goods are contained in Section 3.3.1.4. 
All deceleration devices are considered structural systems and are required to show 
compliance with the appropriate requirements contained within this document. 
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3.2.7 Parachute and Parafoil Systems 
Factor of safety requirements for parachute and parafoil systems are contained in 
Section 3.3.1.5.  
3.2.8 Pressurized Hardware 
Factor of safety requirements for pressurized hardware are contained in Section 3.3.1.6. 
Section B contains a definition of pressurized hardware. Separate definitions are 
provided for pressure vessels, habitable modules and pressurized structures to 
differentiate between them. 
3.2.8.1 Pressurized Hardware Design Requirements 
[STR0019] Pressurized hardware shall maintain dimensional stability required for 
functionality of structural and mechanical attachments, pressure connections, and 
openings for doors or hatches throughout their service life in the applicable 
environments. 
Rationale
3.2.8.2 Pressure Control 
: The intent of this requirement is to ensure successful function and 
operation of structural and mechanical attachments, pressure connections, and 
openings for doors or hatches by taking into account worst-case dimensional 
variations over the service life environment. This requirement also applies to 
habitable modules. 
[STR0020] Pressure regulators, relief devices and thermal control systems (e.g. 
heaters) shall collectively be two-fault tolerant from causing the pressure to exceed the 
Maximum Design Pressure (MDP) of the system. 
Rationale B: A definition of Maximum Design Pressure is provided in Section . 
Two-fault tolerance pressure control is a heritage approach used for Shuttle 
payload and International Space Station requirements to define maximum system 
pressure used for structural design purposes.   
In cases where MDP is not defined because two-fault tolerant pressure control is 
not provided, a Maximum Expected Operating Pressure (MEOP) condition may 
be substituted with approval of the NASA Technical Authority. This substitution is 
limited to cases where a two-fault tolerant pressure regulation device logic is 
unobtainable or impractical, such as solid rocket motors, combustion chambers, 
and pyrotechnic devices. Solid rocket motors, combustion chambers, and 
pyrotechnic devices may use MEOP without special approval. 
SMC-S-005, Section 4.1.2 provides guidance for performing a system functional 
analysis to determine that the pressurized system will not lead to unsafe 
conditions. This guidance should be applied considering any two malfunctions or 
errors to be compliant with the two-fault tolerance requirement. 
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NSTS/ISS 18798 provides guidance for using a single burst disk in place of the 
second and third controls in a two-fault tolerant pressure control system. This 
guidance is documented in the memo TA-88-074, “Fault Tolerance of Systems 
using Specially Certified Burst Disks.”  
3.2.8.3 Relief Devices 
[STR0021] All pressure relief devices shall provide full-flow relief at a pressure of 110% 
MDP or lower. 
Rationale
3.2.8.4 Metallic Pressurized Hardware 
: Flow rate capability of the individual pressure relief devices in the 
redundant system should be sufficient to prevent over-pressure or rupture. SMC-
S-005, Section 5.8 provides guidance for the design and verification of pressure 
relief devices. 
[STR0022] Metallic pressure vessels, pressurized structures, special pressurized 
equipment and pressure components shall comply with ANSI/AIAA-S-080, Standard for 
Space Systems - Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized Structures, and Pressure 
Components, with the following exceptions: 
a. Applicable loads and environments to be used in place of those defined in the AIAA 
standard are derived following JSC 65829, Loads and Structural Dynamics 
Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware. 
b. Applicable minimum factors of safety to be used in place of those defined in the 
AIAA standard are defined in Section 3.3.1.6. 
c. Applicable design pressures to be used in place of those defined in the AIAA 
standard are defined in Section 3.2.8.2. 
d. Applicable design pressures to be used in place of those defined in the AIAA 
standard for cryostats (dewars) are the higher of MDP or the pressure achieved 
under maximum venting conditions. 
Rationale
3.2.8.5 Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 
: The AIAA standard for metallic pressurized hardware is tailored to 
account for human spaceflight safety factor requirements and design loads. 
[STR0023] Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) shall comply with 
ANSI/AIAA-S-081, Standard for Space Systems - Composite Overwrapped Pressure 
Vessels (COPVs), with the following exceptions: 
a. Applicable loads and environments to be used in place of those derived following the 
AIAA standard are defined in JSC 65829, Loads and Structural Dynamics 
Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware. 
b. Applicable minimum factors of safety to be used in place of those defined in the 
AIAA standard are defined in Section 3.3.1.6. 
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c. Applicable design pressures to be used in place of those defined in the AIAA 
standard are defined in Section 3.2.8.2. 
Rationale
3.2.8.6 Pressure Stabilized Structures 
: The AIAA standard for COPVs is tailored to account for human 
spaceflight safety factor requirements and design loads. 
[STR0024] Pressure stabilized structures shall maintain the minimum required internal 
pressure to withstand limit load multiplied by the appropriate ultimate factor of safety for 
all phases of service life. 
Rationale
NSTS/ISS 18798 provides guidance to design a single-fault tolerant pressure 
monitoring technique to ensure the minimum design factors of safety will exist 
when the structural load is applied. This guidance is documented in the memo 
TA-89-064, “Verification of the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) 
Payload Propellant Tank Pressures for Pressure Stabilized Tanks.”  
: Pressure stabilized structures are those structures that must contain a 
minimum pressure to maintain structural integrity. The applicable factors of safety 
are those defined for pressurized structures. 
3.2.8.7 Doors and Hatches in Habitable Modules 
[STR0025] Habitable modules shall withstand applicable loads with the doors or 
hatches in the open and closed condition for the applicable ground and mission 
environments. 
Rationale
3.2.8.8 Flow-Induced Vibrations 
: Habitable module structural integrity must be maintained throughout 
all phases of service life for all hardware configurations, including conditions 
where the hatches and doors are opened or closed. 
[STR0026] All flexible hoses and bellows shall be designed to exclude or control flow-
induced vibrations. 
Rationale
Preferred analytical methods for assessment of formed convolutes are provided 
in MSFC-DWG- 20M02540, Assessment of Flexible Lines for Flow Induced 
Vibration. 
: The configuration of flexible hose and bellow designs should mitigate 
any detrimental effects on structural integrity or life caused by flow induced 
vibration. 
Methods for certification of hardware are provided in NSTS 08123, Certification of 
Flex Hoses and Bellows for Flow Induced Vibration and MSFC-SPEC-626, Test 
Control Document for Assessment of Flexible Lines for Flow Induced Vibration. 
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3.2.8.9 Restraints for Flexible Hoses 
[STR0027] Flexible hose installations shall be restrained to prevent whiplash in the 
event of a burst. 
Rationale
3.2.8.10 Secondary Volumes 
: SMC-S-005, Section 5.11.2 provides guidance for designing the 
restraints of flexible hose installations that are six feet long or greater, including 
factors of safety and the method to calculate the design load. The need for 
restraints on flex hoses shorter than six feet should be evaluated based on the 
specific design and environmental conditions for each installation and the 
potential result of whiplash. 
[STR0028] Secondary compartments or volumes that are integral or attached by design 
to pressurized system components and can become pressurized as a result of a 
credible single barrier failure in the pressurized system component shall be designed for 
pressure with a minimum factor of safety of 1.5 based on MDP of the pressurized 
system. 
Rationale
3.2.8.4
:  If external leakage would not present a catastrophic hazard, the 
secondary volume may be vented or equipped with a relief provision in lieu of 
designing for system pressure. Failures of redundant seals in series that have 
been acceptance pressure tested individually prior to flight are not considered to 
be a credible single barrier failure. Failures of structural parts, such as pressure 
lines and tanks, or welded/brazed joints designed in accordance with Section 
 are not considered to be a credible single barrier failure. 
Metal bellows or diaphragms are normally considered to be credible single barrier 
failure unless they are designed to the pressure component factors of safety in 
Section 3.3.1.6 and meet the life requirements in Section 3.2.3. 
3.2.9 Liquid Propulsion Engine Structures 
Factor of safety requirements for liquid fueled space propulsion systems with less than 
6000 pounds of thrust are contained in Section 3.3.1.7. This document does not cover 
requirements for larger engines, which are contained in NASA-STD-5012, Strength and 
Life Assessment Requirements for Liquid Fueled Space Propulsion System Engines. 
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3.2.9.1 Engines with Less Than 6000 Pounds of Thrust 
[STR0029] The design of engine structures and engine compartments in liquid fueled 
space propulsion systems with less than 6000 pounds of thrust shall comply with the 
following sections of NASA-STD-5012, Strength and Life Assessment Requirements for 
Liquid Fueled Space Propulsion System Engines: 
a. Section 4.2.1.11, “Other Design Factors” in conjunction with NASA-STD-5012, 
Table 1 
b. Section 4.2.4.3.b, “Creep Analysis” to demonstrate 10.0 times the service life 
c. Section 4.2.2.3, “Acceptance/Proof Tests” to limit proof loads to 95% on net 
section yield and 75% on net section ultimate 
Rationale
3.3.1.7
: NASA-STD-5012 is not applicable to engines with a thrust less than 
6000 pounds. These requirements plus the factor of safety requirements in 
Section  are a tailoring of NASA-STD-5012 for smaller engines. 
3.2.10 Solid Rocket Motors 
Factor of safety requirements for solid rocket motors are contained in Section 3.3.1.8.  
Applicable design pressures to be used in place of those defined in the AIAA standards 
are defined in Section 3.2.8.2.  Solid rocket motors may use MEOP without special 
approval. 
3.2.11 Rotating Machinery 
Factor of safety requirements for rotating machinery are contained in Section 3.3.1.9. 
Examples of rotating machinery include motors, gyroscopes, flywheels, transmissions, 
high-speed gears, and pumps that are not part of the liquid propulsion engine system. 
Liquid propulsion engine systems are covered by Section 3.2.9.  
3.2.11.1 Design Loads for Rotating Machinery 
[STR0030] Design loads for rotating machinery shall consider all applicable loads over 
the service life including self induced loads due to operation. 
Rationale
3.2.11.2 Rotor Dynamics 
: The design load case definition should consider all relevant loads and 
load cycles over the service life as well as self-induced conditions due to 
operation. 
[STR0031] Critical speeds shall not be of a type or of a frequency response that would 
be deleterious to the safety and operation of the rotating machinery system. 
Rationale: The design load case definition should consider all relevant loads and 
load cycles over the service life as well as self-induced conditions due to 
operation. The required frequency margins for any rotating machinery system 
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should be specified by the system’s procuring authority. Safe operational and 
Maximum Design Speeds (MDS) must be defined to ensure safe operation and 
structural integrity and to prevent over-speed of the system.  
3.2.11.3 Stability Requirements for Rotating Machinery 
[STR0032] Rotating machinery design shall be free of instability.   
Rationale
3.2.11.4 Strength Requirements for Rotating Machinery 
: Acceptable methods to prevent instability and permit stable 
performance include vibration isolation, damping or related means. 
[STR0033] Rotating machinery components shall maintain structural integrity at 
Maximum Design Speed (MDS) taking into account the applicable factors of safety. 
Rationale
B
: To ensure adequate design margins of safety, stresses induced at 
maximum design speed must be increased by the appropriate factors of safety. 
Maximum Design Speed is defined in Section . Factor of safety requirements 
for rotating machinery are contained in Section 3.3.1.9. 
3.2.12 Wire Rope and Cables 
Factor of safety requirements for wire rope and cables used as part of a spacecraft 
structural system are contained in Section 3.3.1.10. 
3.2.13 Fasteners and Fastened Joints 
[STR0034] Structural fasteners and fastened joints shall comply with JSC 65830, rev. 2, 
Interim Requirements and Standard Practices for Mechanical Joints with Threaded 
Fasteners in Spaceflight Hardware. 
Note: When released, NASA-STD-5020, Requirements and Standard Practices 
for Mechanical Joints with Threaded Fasteners in Spaceflight Hardware, may be 
used in place of JSC 65830. 
Rationale
Factor of safety requirements for fasteners and fastened joints are defined by the 
appropriate factors of safety for the joined structure such as Section 
: Fastened joints themselves need to maintain structural integrity for 
failure modes such as fastener bearing on the joint, fastener tear-out of the joint 
and insert pull-out of the joint.  For composite joints, there is also the potential 
need for the joint itself to maintain structural integrity for pull-through of the 
fastener head (or nut pull-through) as well as for crushing of the joint due to 
applied preload for the fastener. These are considerations that are not covered in 
JSC 65830 or NASA-STD-5020 and should be addressed in the SVP. 
3.3.1.2 for 
metallic flight structures and Section 3.3.1.2 for joints considered to be 
discontinuities in composite structures. A specific fitting factor is defined in 
Section 3.3.1.11. 
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3.2.14 Seals 
The requirements in this section apply to critical seals. A seal is a critical seal if it meets 
any of the following:  
a. a seal through which leakage would constitute a catastrophic or critical failure 
within habitable module pressure shells,  
b. a seal through which atmosphere of within any habitable volume module may 
leak to the external environment, or  
c. a seal through which flow may intrude into the spacecraft habitable module 
during atmospheric entry. 
This document does not define seal performance or leak rate requirements, which are 
typically provided in the system requirements or subsystem specifications. Other 
requirements may define redundancy requirements for items not considered to be 
critical seals above. Safety requirements and failure analysis may define additional 
redundancy requirements to the ones listed below.  
Factor of safety requirements for seal assemblies are defined by the appropriate factors 
of safety for the sealed structure such as Section 3.3.1.2 for metallic flight structures 
and Section 3.3.1.6 for pressurized hardware.  
3.2.14.1 Critical Seal Redundancy 
[STR0035] Critical seals with a major outer diameter less than or equal to 0.5 inches 
shall have a minimum of one seal at the interface.   
Rationale
3.2.14.2 Critical Seal Redundancy 
:  This requirement applies for feed-through connection, rotary, window, 
hatches/doors, mating mechanisms, and structural seals. Feed-through 
connections include valves, gages and transducers. Critical seals should be leak 
tested at the assembly level after final installation prior to launch. For 
hatches/doors that are sealed immediately prior to launch this may constitute 
complete testing in the assembly building and abbreviated testing at the pad.  
[STR0036] Critical seals with a major outer diameter greater than 0.5 inches shall have 
a minimum of two seals at the interface.   
Rationale:  This requirement applies for feed-through connection, rotary, window, 
hatches/doors, mating mechanisms, and structural seals. Feed-through 
connections include valves, gages and transducers. Critical seals should be leak 
tested at the assembly level after final installation prior to launch. For 
hatches/doors that are sealed immediately prior to launch this may constitute 
complete testing in the assembly building and abbreviated testing at the pad. 
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3.2.14.3 Critical Seal Test Ports 
[STR0037] Assemblies containing critical seals with a major outer diameter greater than 
6 inches shall include leak test ports and conductance grooves within the seal interstitial 
area to accommodate redundant seal verification.  
Rationale
3.3 DESIGN FACTORS 
:  Leak test ports and conductance grooves are needed to leak test 
each seal individually. 
3.3.1 Factors of Safety 
This section contains factors of safety applicable to primary and secondary structures. 
The factors of safety should be used for analysis to demonstrate positive margins of 
safety and for qualification, proof or acceptance tests as specified in the applicable 
tables. Yielding is permitted in some instances. 
The factors of safety tables in this section include acceptance, proof and qualification 
test factors. The proof factor is the minimum required. A higher proof test factor may be 
determined by fracture mechanics analysis when the proof test is used for flaw 
screening. Certain acceptance and proof test requirements may exceed the minimum 
factor of safety on yield for the hardware being provided. Hardware providers should 
ensure that no detrimental deformation will occur during acceptance testing. 
Current standard NASA structural verification criteria are deterministic, and experience 
has shown these deterministic criteria to be adequate. The probabilistic method uses 
knowledge (or assumptions) of the statistical variability of the design variables to select 
design criteria for achieving an overall acceptable reliability and confidence level. Any 
proposed use of probabilistic criteria to supplement deterministic factors of safety 
requires NASA Technical Authority approval. 
Guidelines for combining mechanical stresses may be found in Section A3 of NASA-
TM-X-73305, Astronautic Structures Manual.  
The factors apply to nominal design conditions, which may include abort scenarios. 
Program-defined emergency design loads are generally applied with an ultimate factor 
of safety of 1.0. The specific conditions that constitute nominal and emergency cases 
are defined in the SRD. 
Factors of safety are in some cases higher for ISS specific events which are 
documented in SSP 50808. 
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3.3.1.1 Mechanical and Thermal Factors of Safety 
[STR0038] The factors of safety and test factors shall be applied to both mechanical 
and thermal stresses/loads. 
Rationale
Thermal stresses and loads are derived from thermal models that are often 
uncertain and unverified, and typically are available later in the design phase 
than required for structural design. The same factor of safety is applied to thermal 
stresses and loads as mechanical due to this uncertainty. A lower factor of safety 
may be proposed if the thermal data used for structural design can be 
demonstrated to have a low level of uncertainty. 
: A majority of the factors of safety in this document apply to mechanical 
stresses and loads. Examples of mechanical loads are: inertial, aerodynamic 
pressure, random vibration, shock and crew-induced loads. 
3.3.1.2 Metallic Structures 
[STR0039] Metallic flight hardware structure shall be designed and tested to the 
minimum factors of safety specified in Table 3.3.1.2-1.  
Rationale
Post-separation factors are intended for re-use hardware that is refurbished after 
a mission. Hardware that separates from the vehicle that would constitute a 
catastrophic or critical hazard if it were to fail post-separation must analyze to full 
factors of safety for that condition. 
: Criteria are specified for design and test of flight articles when the 
actual flight hardware is tested (protoflight), and when qualification tests are 
conducted on a separate (prototype) article. 
Untested structures are those with no structural loads test to qualification or proof 
levels. Applicable structures may include pallets, components (chassis), 
brackets, blanket or cabling supports, and other secondary structures. Some 
organizations use a higher factor of safety for untested structures. The use of a 
higher factor of safety is not necessarily sufficient to account for analysis 
uncertainty and possible unconservatism in load factor calculation and 
application. Untested factors of safety may be used with approval of the NASA 
Technical Authority. Acceptable criteria to justify these factors of safety include: 
a. The structural design is simple, with easily determined load paths; it has been 
thoroughly analyzed for all critical load conditions; and there is a high 
confidence in the magnitude of all significant loading events.   
b. The structure is similar in overall configuration, design detail, and critical load 
conditions to a previous structure which was successfully test verified, with 
good correlation of test results to analytical predictions.  
c. Development and/or component tests have been successfully completed on 
critical, difficult to analyze elements of the structure. Good analytical model 
correlation to test results has been demonstrated.   
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For components and secondary structures, the tests in items b) & c) could 
include random vibration testing, where that has been determined to be the major 
portion of the expected flight loading for the component/structure.   
Table 3.3.1.2-1 - Minimum Factors of Safety for Metallic Flight Structures 
 
3.3.1.2.1 Beryllium Structures 
[STR0040] Structural hardware constructed of beryllium shall be designed and tested to 
the minimum factors of safety specified in Table 3.3.1.2-2. 
Rationale
The buckling margin of safety applies to beryllium structures subjected to 
buckling loads. The buckling margin should be determined using the ultimate 
factor of safety times limit load. 
:  Special consideration must be given to beryllium structures due to the 
brittle nature of the material and sensitivity to flaws that can be induced during 
the fabrication process. Fabrication requirements are provided in NASA-STD-
6016, Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft; however, 
unique qualification and proof testing should be defined for the specific 
application. The test plans should include consideration of the number of 
identical items fabricated, the degree of out-of-plane loading due to the 
anisotropic nature of beryllium, and the ability to perform detailed inspections of 
the hardware after test.  
Table 3.3.1.2-2 – Minimum Factors of Safety for Beryllium Structures 
 
Yield Ultimate
1.00 1.40
1.40
1.25 1.40
1.20
1.00 1.25
1.25
Minimum Factors of Safety for Metallic Flight Structures
Qualification Test Factor
Protoflight
Proof Test Factor
Factors for hardware post-separation, not going to orbit, prototype program
Prototype
Qualification Test Factor
Yield Ultimate
1.00 1.40
1.40
1.00
10%
Prototype
Qualification Test Factor
Acceptance/Proof Test Factor
Minimum buckling margin of safety
Minimum Factors of Safety for Beryllium
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3.3.1.3 Non-Metallic Flight Structures 
[STR0041] Non-metallic flight hardware structure shall be designed and tested to the 
minimum factors of safety specified in Table 3.3.1.3-1. 
Rationale
See the glossary in Section 
:  Criteria are specified for design and test of flight articles when the 
actual flight hardware is tested (protoflight), and when qualification tests are 
conducted on a separate (prototype) article. 
B for the definition of a discontinuity. Examples of 
discontinuity areas in non-metallic structures include: reinforced holes or cut-
outs; bolted, pinned, mechanically fastened or other junctions with fittings; rapid 
ply drops or pad-ups; core ramps for sandwich structures; pre-form junctions; 
adhesive joints; or discrete areas with load introduction or boundary conditions. 
Composite discontinuities that are development tested (e.g. M&P testing for ramp 
downs and tapers) can be counted as tested structures. Either use results from 
development testing or heritage data to justify using the tested factor of safety. 
When test or heritage data is not available use an ultimate factor of safety of 2.0. 
An ultimate factor of safety greater than the test factors defined in the table may 
be needed if fracture control requires testing to higher levels. 
Table 3.3.1.3-1 – Minimum Factors of Safety for Non-metallic Flight Structures 
 
3.3.1.4 Structural Soft Goods 
[STR0042] Structural soft goods shall be designed and tested to the minimum factors of 
safety specified in Table 3.3.1.4-1. 
Rationale
Yield Ultimate
N/A 1.40
N/A 2.00
1.40
1.05
1.50
2.00
1.20
Minimum Factors of Safety for Non-metallic Flight Structures
Uniform areas
Discontinuity areas
Qualification Test Factor
Acceptance/Proof Test Factor
Protoflight
Prototype
Uniform areas
Discontinuity areas
Acceptance/Proof Test Factor
: Straps, fabrics, inflatable structures, gossamer structures and other 
soft goods that carry structural loads upon launch or deployment are structural 
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soft goods. Soft goods whose failure can result in either a critical or catastrophic 
hazard are safety critical structural soft goods. 
Parachute and parafoil systems have specific factor of safety requirements in 
Section 3.3.1.5. 
All structural soft goods are required to be test verified. 
Table 3.3.1.4-1 – Minimum Factors of Safety for Structural Soft Goods 
 
3.3.1.5 Parachute and Parafoil Systems 
[STR0043] Parachute and parafoil systems shall be designed and tested to the 
minimum factors of safety specified in Table 3.3.1.5-1. 
Rationale
The preferred method to develop design factors for fabrics is provided in 
NWC TP 6575, Parachute Recovery Systems Design Manual. MIL-DTL-83420M, 
General Specification for Flexible Wire Rope for Aircraft Control provides 
procurement guidance for steel cable and wire rope to guarantee strength 
properties and justify use of the noted factors of safety. Safety critical 
components in parachute and parafoil systems are typically items where a single 
point failure can result in a catastrophic hazard. 
: The factors of safety in this section cover all material types used in 
parachute and parafoil systems such as fabric and steel cables. 
Table 3.3.1.5-1 – Minimum Factors of Safety for Parachute and Parafoil Systems 
 
Ultimate
4.00
4.00
1.20
2.00
2.00
1.20
Acceptance/Proof Test Factor
Minimum Factors of Safety for Structural Soft Goods
Qualification Test Factor
Not safety critical
Acceptance/Proof Test Factor
Qualification Test Factor
Safety critical
Ultimate
1.60
1.50
1.70
2.00
Subsonic systems, manned
Subsonic systems, unmanned
Supersonic systems
Safety critical components
Minimum Factors of Safety for Parachute and Parafoil Systems
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3.3.1.6 Pressurized Hardware 
[STR0044] Pressurized hardware shall be designed and tested to the minimum factors 
of safety specified in Table 3.3.1.6-1. 
Rationale
Additional factor of safety requirements for liquid propulsion engine structures 
and solid rocket motors are provided in Sections 
: Proof tests are conducted as an acceptance test of each production 
unit including the qualification article. The proof factor is the minimum required. A 
higher proof test factor may be determined by fracture mechanics analysis when 
the proof test is used for flaw screening. 
3.3.1.7 and 3.3.1.8 respectively. 
MEP = Maximum External Pressure 
[STR0045] 
Table 3.3.1.6-1 – Minimum Factors of Safety for Pressurized Hardware 
 
Yield(1) Ultimate(1)
1.00 1.40
1.50 x MDP
4.00 x MDP
2.50 x MEP
1.00 1.40
1.50 x MDP
2.50 x MDP
2.50 x MEP
1.00 1.40
1.50 x MDP
2.50 x MDP
2.50 x MEP
1.00 1.40
1.50 x MDP
2.00 x MDP
1.00 x MEP
1.00(3) 1.40
1.25 x MDP
2.00 x MDP
1.00 x MEP
(Continued on next page.)
Design Burst Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential
Minimum Factors of Safety for Pressurized Hardware
Proof Pressure
Proof Pressure
Design Burst Pressure
Lines and fittings less than 1.5 inches (38 mm) outside diameter
Proof Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential(2)
Lines and fittings, 1.5 inches (38 mm) outside diameter or greater
Other pressure system components such as actuating cylinders, valves, regulators, 
filters, switches, heat pipes and line-installed alignment bellows
Negative Pressure Differential
Proof Pressure
Design Burst Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential(2)
Design Burst Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential
Proof Pressure
Design Burst Pressure
Metallic pressure vessels, sealed containers and cryostats (dewars)
Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV)
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Yield(1) Ultimate(1)
1.65 2.00
Proof Pressure 1.50 x MDP
N/A 1.50
N/A 2.00
1.00 1.40
2.00 x MDP
4.00 x MDP
2.50 x MEP
1.10 1.40
1.10 x MDP
1.40 x MDP
1.00 x MEP
1.10 1.40
1.05 x MDP
1.00 x MEP
N/A 1.50
1.20 x MDP
1.00 x MEP
Notes:
Flex hoses, all diameters
Proof Pressure(4)
Design Burst Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential
Pressurized structures, if not solid rocket motor cases or specified below:
Proof Pressure
Doors, hatches and habitable modules
1. Yield and ultimate factors of safety for pressurized hardware are used in the combined loading equation 
for mechanical (K1), thermal (K2) and pressure (K3) factors. The ultimate factors of safety are used for the 
pressure only load case when a burst pressure is not defined. The yield factors of safety or the proof 
pressure may be used for the pressure only load case to prevent yielding depending on the specific 
application.
Minimum Factors of Safety for Pressurized Hardware (Continued)
3. The yield factor of safety is only applicable to metallic portion of the COPV.
Metallic propellant tanks that are pressurized structures
Composite propellant tanks that are pressurized structures
Proof Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential(2)
Proof Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential(2)
Ultimate Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential(2)
Internal pressure only
Negative pressure differential if certified by Analysis Only
Negative Pressure Differential(2)
2. Must be capable of withstanding maximum external pressure multiplied by ultimate factor of safety 
(Negative Pressure Differential) without collapse or rupture when internally pressurized to the minimum 
anticipated operating pressure.
4. In a system with fluid lines and flex hoses, the individual flex hoses shall be proof tested to 2.00 x MDP; 
this factor does not apply at the assembly level.
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3.3.1.7 Liquid Propulsion Engine Structures 
[STR0046] Engine structures and engine compartments in liquid fueled space 
propulsion systems with less than 6000 pounds of thrust shall be designed and tested to 
the minimum factors of safety specified in NASA-STD-5012, Table 1. 
Rationale
3.2.9.1
: NASA-STD-5012 is not applicable to engines with a thrust less than 
6000 pounds. These requirements plus the factor of safety requirements in 
Section  are a tailoring of NASA-STD-5012 for smaller engines. 
3.3.1.8 Solid Rocket Motors 
[STR0047] Solid rocket motors shall be designed and tested to the minimum factors of 
safety specified in Table 3.3.1.8-1. 
Rationale
MEP = Maximum External Pressure 
: Proof tests are conducted as an acceptance test of each production 
unit including the qualification article. The proof factor is the minimum required. A 
higher proof test factor may be determined by fracture mechanics analysis when 
the proof test is used for flaw screening. 
Solid rocket motors may use MEOP instead of MDP. 
Table 3.3.1.8-1 – Minimum Factors of Safety for Solid Rocket Motors 
 
  
Yield Ultimate
1.10 1.40
1.05 x MDP
1.00 x MEP
N/A 1.50
1.20 x MDP
1.00 x MEP
2.00
Notes:
Proof Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential(1)
1. Must be capable of withstanding maximum external pressure multiplied by ultimate factor of safety 
(Negative Pressure Differential) without collapse or rupture when internally pressurized to the minimum 
anticipated operating pressure.
Minimum Factors of Safety for Solid Rocket Motors
Solid propellant, insulation, liner and inhibitor
Metallic solid rocket motor cases that are pressurized structures
Composite solid rocket motor cases that are pressurized structures
Proof Pressure
Negative Pressure Differential(1)
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3.3.1.9 Rotating Machinery 
[STR0048] Rotating machinery shall be designed and tested to the minimum factors of 
safety specified in 3.3.1.9-1 where the speed of the spin test is defined by Equation 1. 
Rationale
3.3.1.7
: The requirements in this section are intended to address design 
issues for equipment where rotational effects are structurally significant and 
where a failure would cause a catastrophic or critical hazard. Examples include 
motors, gyroscopes, flywheels, transmissions, high-speed gears, and pumps that 
are not part of the liquid propulsion engine system. Liquid propulsion engine 
systems are covered by Section . 
FSspin
Qualification and proof tests should be conducted in the operational environment. 
If testing in the operational environment is not feasible, tests can be performed in 
a nonoperational environment if an Environmental Correction Factor (ECF) is 
applied. Section 
 = the larger of the two values given in the table for proof and qualification 
spin tests 
B contains a definition of ECF. 
Table 3.3.1.9-1 – Minimum Factors of Safety for Rotating Machinery 
 
Equation 1 – Proof and Qualification Spin Test Speed 
 
3.3.1.10 Wire Ropes and Cables 
[STR0049] Wire ropes and cables shall be designed and tested to the minimum factors 
of safety specified in Table 3.3.1.10-1. 
Rationale
 
: Typically large variations in strength properties are inherent to wire 
rope and cable in structural designs. MIL-DTL-83420M, General Specification for 
Flexible Wire Rope for Aircraft Control provides procurement guidance for steel 
cable and wire rope to guarantee strength properties and justify use of lower 
factors of safety. 
  
Yield Ultimate
1.10 1.40
the greater of 1.05 or 1.1 x ECF
the greater of 1.05 or 1.2 x ECF
Proof Spin Test Factor
Qualification Spin Test Factor
Minimum Factors of Safety for Rotating Machinery
Rotating Machinery
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Table 3.3.1.10-1 – Minimum Factors of Safety for Wire Ropes and Cables 
 
3.3.1.11 Fasteners and Fastened Joints 
[STR0050] Design analysis of structural joints and fittings shall consider a fitting factor 
of 1.15 to be applied to limit and ultimate load conditions for all phases of service life. 
Rationale
a. Application of the factor is intended for fittings or joints whose strength is not 
proven by limit and ultimate load tests in which the actual stress conditions 
are simulated and measured in the fitting and surrounding structure. 
: The fitting factor is used to account for potential variations in internal 
load paths within the actual structure that are not covered by idealized analytical 
models. 
b. A fitting factor need not be used where the type of joint, such as a continuous 
row of fasteners in sheet or plate, a welded or bonded joint, or a scarf joint in 
metal or plastic, etc., is strength verified based on comprehensive limit and 
ultimate tests. 
c. This factor should apply to all portions of the fitting, the means of fastening, 
and the bearing on the members joined. 
d. In the case of integral fittings, the part should be treated as a fitting up to the 
point where the section properties become typical of the member away from 
the joint. 
3.3.2 Combined Loading 
[STR0051] Structures shall be designed and tested for combined loading as specified in 
Equation 2 and Equation 3 using the design factor of safety on yield and ultimate from 
the factors of safety tables when the (K x L) term is additive to the algebraic sum.  
Rationale
3.3.1
: The most severe combination of thermal, mechanical, and pressure 
loads occurring at the same time or during the same mission event should be 
combined in a rational manner. Factors of safety are defined in Section  for 
different types of materials and hardware for mechanical (K1) and thermal (K2
3.3.1.6
) 
stresses/loads. Yield and ultimate factors of safety for pressurized hardware and 
liquid propulsion engine structures defined in Sections  and 3.3.1.7 are 
used in the combined loading equation for mechanical (K1), thermal (K2) and 
pressure (K3
Ultimate
4.00
2.00
Minimum Factors of Safety for Wire Ropes and Cables
Wire Ropes and Cables
Acceptance/Proof Test Factor
) factors.  
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Testing of combined loads is appropriate when the combined load case drives 
the design. Test cases should consider an ECF when the flight environment 
cannot be replicated during testing. 
K1_yld and K1_ult
K
 = yield and ultimate factors of safety for mechanical 
stresses/loads. 
2_yld and K2_ult
K
 = yield and ultimate factors of safety for thermal stresses/loads. 
3_yld and K3_ult
L
 = yield and ultimate factors of safety for pressure stresses/loads. 
mechanical 
L
= internal loads (forces, stresses, and/or strains) due to externally 
applied mechanical limit loads; e.g., inertial loads, aerodynamic pressure 
thermal 
L
= internal loads (forces, stresses, and/or strains) due to thermally-induced 
loads at the maximum and minimum predicted temperatures including modeling 
uncertainty margins 
pressure
This requirement is based on the approach described in AIAA S-110-2005, 
Section 6.1.1.1. 
 = internal loads (forces, stresses, and/or strains) due to design limit 
pressures, unless the pressure loads are relieving or stabilizing when the 
minimum pressure value should be used instead 
 
Equation 2 – Combination for Ultimate Stress/Load 
(K1_ult x Lmechanical) + (K2_ult x Lthermal) + (K3_ult x Lpressure
 
) = Total Ultimate Stress/Load 
Equation 3 – Combination for Yield Stress/Load 
(K1_yld x Lmechanical) + (K2_yld x Lthermal) + (K3_yld x Lpressure
 
) = Total Yield Stress/Load 
3.3.2.1 Combining with Mechanical Stress/Load 
[STR0052] The mechanical stresses/loads shall not be multiplied by the factor of safety 
in calculating the design yield or ultimate stress/load if they are relieving or stabilizing to 
the structure. 
Rationale: K1
3.3.2.2 Combining with Thermal Stress/Load 
 = 1 in the combined loads equation when mechanical 
stresses/loads relieve the thermal and pressure stresses/loads. 
[STR0053] Thermal stresses/loads shall be combined with mechanical and pressure 
stresses/loads when they are additive but not when they are relieving. 
Rationale: K2 = 0 in the combined loads equation when thermal stresses/loads 
relieve the mechanical and pressure stresses/loads. 
    JSC 65828 
Rev. A 
 
This document represents the technical consensus of the 
developing group but does not yet have final NASA approval. 
 
 35 
3.3.2.3 Combining with Pressure Stress/Load 
[STR0054] The pressure stresses/loads shall not be multiplied by the factor of safety in 
calculating the design yield or ultimate stress/load if they are relieving or stabilizing to 
the structure. 
Rationale: K3
3.3.2.4 Relieving Pressure Loads 
 = 1 in the combined loads equation when pressure stresses/loads 
relieve the mechanical and thermal stresses/loads. 
[STR0055] In circumstances where pressure loads have a relieving or stabilizing effect 
on structural load capability, the minimum value of such relieving loads shall be used. 
Rationale
3.3.3 Life Factors 
: Pressure loads may relieve or stabilize the mechanical, thermal or 
even internal pressure loads.  
3.3.3.1 Fatigue Analysis Factor 
[STR0056] The design analysis used to assess the fatigue life of flight hardware 
structure shall multiply limit stress/strain by a Fatigue Analysis Factor (FAF), 1.15 on 
typical fatigue properties or 1.0 on lower bound fatigue properties, prior to entering the 
stress versus cycle life (S/N) design curve to determine the low-cycle and high-cycle 
fatigue life. 
Rationale 3.2.3: The FAF and the life factors from Section  are intended to provide 
margin to account for material fatigue curve data scatter. Other factors should be 
considered if applicable to account for effects such as surface finish, anodizing, 
temperature, environment, size effect, corrosion, plating, spraying, cyclic 
frequency, etc. 
Low-cycle and high-cycle fatigue are defined in Section B. 
3.3.3.2 Rotating Machinery Fatigue Analysis Factor 
[STR0057] The design analysis used to assess fatigue life for rotating machinery shall 
multiply limit stress/strain by an additional Fatigue Analysis Factor (FAF), 1.25 for 
rotating components and 1.15 for non-rotating components, prior to entering the S-N 
design curve to determine the low-cycle/ high-cycle fatigue life. 
Rationale 3.2.3: The FAF and the life factors from Section  are intended to provide 
margin to account for material fatigue curve data scatter. Other factors should be 
considered if applicable to account for effects such as surface finish, anodizing, 
temperature, environment, size effect, corrosion, plating, spraying, cyclic 
frequency, etc. 
Low-cycle and high-cycle fatigue are defined in Section B. 
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3.3.3.3 Creep Life Factor 
[STR0058] The design analysis used to assess the creep life of flight hardware 
structure shall multiply the limit stress/strain by a minimum factor of 1.15 prior to 
entering the design curve to determine creep life. 
Rationale 3.2.3: This factor along with the life factors from Section  is intended to 
provide margin to account for material data scatter. 
3.3.4 Bearing Factor for Joints Subjected to Hammering Action 
[STR0059] Parts that have clearance (free fit), and are subject to pounding or vibration, 
must have a bearing factor large enough to provide for the effects of normal relative 
motion. 
Rationale
The bearing factor applies to joints within mechanical systems that have 
significant free play, such as a trunnion pin in retractable landing gear. This factor 
accounts for local dynamic amplification. This requirement is not intended for 
preloaded joints with threaded fasteners. 
: A bearing factor is typically used in conjunction with the yield and 
ultimate factors of safety. Joints subjected to shock or hammering action should 
be assessed with a bearing factor of 2.0. A fitting factor is not used in conjunction 
with this bearing factor when the bearing factor is larger. 
3.4 STRUCTURAL LOADS AND ENVIRONMENTS 
The structural design requirements defined in this document assume the use of limit 
loads, loads spectra and environments developed in accordance with the requirements 
of JSC 65829, Loads and Structural Dynamics Requirements for Spacecraft. Additional 
requirements for loads conditions not addressed in that document are provided in the 
following sections. 
3.4.1 Redistributed Loads 
[STR0060] Structures that are deployed, extended, or otherwise un-stowed to a 
configuration where they cannot withstand subsequent induced loads, or whose load 
paths are controlled by electro-mechanical devices shall be designed to maintain the 
applicable nominal design factors of safety using the redistributed loads after one or two 
credible system failures commensurate with the hazard levels.  
Rationale
Operational procedures may be used to restore the load path or limit the applied 
loads after the first failure. 
: Maximum loads for deployable or on-orbit configurable hardware may 
not be caused by flight events while it is in its stowed configuration. Evaluation of 
hardware in all of its deployed or operating configurations is vital to ensure proper 
identification of the bounding load cases. 
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3.4.2 Loads Due to Friction (Relieving) 
[STR0061] Flight hardware structure shall be designed and analyzed such that friction 
is not considered when it is relieving. 
Rationale
The standard NASA and United States aerospace industry design practice is to 
develop robust hardware using bounding design analyses that do not consider 
the beneficial effects of friction in cases where it acts to reduce induced 
stresses/loads or improve structural margins of safety. 
:  The level of friction acting to restrain hardware at any location in a 
given design under load is inherently uncertain. It is difficult to accurately and 
consistently determine frictional restraint due to factors such as surface finish, 
cleanliness, lubrication, preparation, planarity tolerances, and the specific amount 
of preload under combined loads such as random vibration, thermal, mechanical, 
and pressure.  
3.4.3 Loads Due to Friction (Additive) 
[STR0062] Flight hardware structure shall be designed and analyzed such that friction 
forces are included when they increase the magnitude of the applied load or stress or 
when they are detrimental to the function of the part. 
Rationale
The standard NASA and United States aerospace industry design practice is to 
develop robust hardware using bounding design analyses that consider the 
detrimental effects of friction in cases where it acts to increase induced 
stresses/loads or decrease structural margins of safety. 
:  Detrimental effects due to friction need to be considered to ensure 
that all sources of external load impacting critical induced forces, stresses and 
deflections are considered. Friction may introduce internal paths within the 
structure that would not be otherwise exercised if neglected. 
3.4.4 Design Loads for Collapse 
[STR0063] Design loads for collapse shall be ultimate loads, unless a load component 
alleviates buckling in which case the ultimate factor of safety is not applied to that 
component. 
Rationale
 
:  For combined load cases, which may include any combination of  
mechanical, pressure or thermal loads acting on structure, applying a factor of 
safety to a load component that tends to alleviate buckling will result in an 
unconservative assessment of buckling load capability. 
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3.4.4.1 Destabilizing External Pressure or Torsional Loads  
[STR0064] Destabilizing external pressure or torsional limit loads shall be increased by 
the ultimate factor of safety. 
Rationale:
3.4.4.2 Stabilizing Internal Pressure Loads 
   All combined mechanical, pressure and thermal load components, 
including external pressure or torsional loads, that act to reduce structural 
stability should be increased by the appropriate ultimate factor of safety. 
[STR0065] Internal-pressure loads that stabilize the structure shall not be increased by 
the ultimate factor of safety unless they reduce structural capability. 
Rationale:
3.5 MATH MODELS 
   Load components that tend to increase structural stability, such as 
internal pressure, are not increased by a factor of safety. However, there may be 
conditions where internal pressure reduces structural capability or margins of 
safety. Analyses should be performed for both conditions to determine the 
appropriate application of the FS. 
3.5.1 Model Verification by Test 
[STR0066] Math models used to generate stresses, strains, internal loads or predict 
deflections for structural analysis and design shall be test verified. 
Rationale
The static test article requires adequate instrumentation to provide sufficient test 
data for correlation with the strength model. 
:  Test verification of model predictions will ensure sufficient accuracy 
for data used in design development and structural integrity assessments. 
The model verification test approach, methods, configuration, etc is outlined in 
the SVP. Detailed test information is to be provided in a dedicated test plan. Test 
results and model correlation results are also to be documented in dedicated 
reports submitted for NASA Technical Authority review. 
In some cases testing alone can be used to demonstrate hardware structural 
integrity. Analysis only approaches are also possible. In either case the approach 
should be submitted for NASA Technical Authority review and approval in the 
SVP. 
3.5.2 Model Verification Test Factors 
[STR0067] Model verification test input load levels shall apply appropriate test factors. 
Rationale:  Three test options are generally available for model verification 
testing. Applicable test factors are based on whether or not testing is performed 
using prototype or protoflight hardware. 
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a. Ultimate Load Test – Testing is generally performed on a dedicated prototype 
unit. Test levels correspond to limit load multiplied by the applicable ultimate 
factor of safety defined in Section 3.3.1. 
b. Protoflight Test Option 1 – Test is performed on dedicated prototype or 
protoflight structure. Test levels correspond to limit load multiplied by a test 
factor of 1.2. Test results are used to correlate model predictions per the 
guidelines of Section 3.5.3. Note a minimum yield factor of safety of 1.25 
should be used for design in conjunction with this option to preclude potential 
for yielding due to test. 
c. Protoflight Test Option 2 – Test is performed on dedicated prototype or 
protoflight structure. Test levels correspond to limit load multiplied by a test 
factor of 1.1. Test results are used to correlate model predictions per the 
guidelines of Section 3.5.3. Use of this option requires additional critical 
subcomponent testing at levels up to ultimate load. 
The model verification test approach must be reviewed and approved by the 
NASA Technical Authority. Details of the approach should be provided in the 
SVP and related test plans. 
3.5.3 Model Verification Test Correlation 
[STR0068] Adequate correlation of critical model predictions and test measured data 
shall be demonstrated using the following guidelines:   
1. Math model predictions for critical deflections within 10 percent of the test 
data; 
2. Math model predictions for critical stresses/strains within 10 percent of the 
test data; 
3. If math model predictions are outside the above stated correlation criteria, the 
math model will be updated until it meets the criteria and the analysis rerun; 
4. If the math model predictions are within the correlation criteria but under 
predict the test data, the stress analysis for flight load conditions must be 
updated to reflect structural margins based on stresses that are adjusted 
according to the correlation results. 
5. If the test article demonstrates non-linear response the effect on structural 
margins must be evaluated and included in the stress analysis if significant. 
Rationale:  Inability to adequately correlate model predictions with test data 
results in increased uncertainty in analytical predictions developed using those 
models. An understanding of the implications of the additional uncertainty on 
predicted responses and corresponding impacts on structural design is 
necessary to manage risks. 
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3.6 STRUCTURAL MATERIALS 
Requirements for materials used in the fabrication, processing and testing of flight 
hardware and components are defined in NASA-STD-6016, Standard Materials and 
Processes Requirements for Spacecraft. 
3.6.1 Structural Material Allowable Properties 
[STR0069] Primary structure where failure of a single load path could result in a loss of 
structural integrity shall use Material “A” allowables as defined in Metallic Materials 
Properties Development and Standardization (MMPDS) or MIL-HDBK-17-2, -4, and -5; 
or equivalent.  
Rationale
Material “A” or “A-basis” allowables are specified to assure reliability for critical 
structures.   
:  See NASA-STD-6016, Section 4.1.6 for additional material design 
allowable requirements. Equivalent approaches to Material “A” may be allowed 
via the Material Usage Agreement (MUA) process defined in NASA-STD-6016.  
3.6.2 Material Design and Analysis Thickness 
[STR0070] Stress calculations of pressure vessels, stability critical structure, and single 
load path structure shall use drawing minimum thickness unless it is for a layered 
composite structure. 
Rationale
Layered composite structures are excluded from this requirement because there 
are factors that apply to them (fiber volume - percentage of fibers, ply thickness) 
: The intent of this requirement is to ensure the stress analysis captures 
the thickness variability of the part for conservatism for metallic structures. 
which strongly affect strength and stiffness that are not an independent
Actual as-built dimensions may be used in stress calculations when available. 
 function 
of overall material thickness. These additional factors render the minimum 
thickness calculation method incomplete for conservative analysis.  
3.6.3 Acceptable Dimensional Variations for Welded Joints 
[STR0071] The structural design of the welded joint shall account for the acceptable 
dimensional variations for the welded joint and joint repair.  
Rationale
The acceptable dimensional variations and the sensitivity of the nondestructive 
method used for the welded joint and joint repair may be specified on the 
engineering drawings. 
: As-built dimensions of the welded joint or welded joint repair may be 
used to establish design allowables.  
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A. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
CDR Critical Design Review 
COPV Composite Overwrap Pressure Vessel 
DCR Design Certification Review 
ECF Environmental Correction Factor 
FAF Fatigue Analysis Factor 
FRR Flight Readiness Review 
FS Factor of Safety 
ISS International Space Station 
kPa kiloPascal 
LSP Loads and Structures Panel 
MDP Maximum Design Pressure 
MDS Maximum Design Speed 
MEOP Maximum Expected Operation Pressure 
MEP Maximum External Pressure 
MMPDS Metallic Materials Properties Development and Standardization 
MS Margin of Safety 
MUA Materials Usage Agreement 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
psia pounds per square inch (absolute) 
S-N Stress Level Versus Number of Cycles to Failure 
SRD System Requirements Document 
SVP Structural Verification Plan  
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B. DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of this document, the following definitions apply. 
Acceptance Tests:  Tests performed on flight hardware and software to confirm 
equipment performs as qualified and is generally free of latent manufacturing, material, 
or workmanship defects for delivery of products. For hardware, acceptance testing is 
typically performed at operating and non-operating performance and environment limits 
without intruding into qualification margins.  
A-Basis Material Properties:  The lower of either a statistically calculated number, or the 
specification minimum. The statistically calculated number indicates that at least 99 
percent of the population of values is expected to equal or exceed the A-basis 
mechanical design property, with a confidence of 95 percent. 
Allowable Load or Stress:  The load or stress which is consistent with the limits imposed 
by the structural criteria being addressed when considering minimum material 
dimensions and material properties. An allowable load based on yield criteria is the 
maximum load at which structural yielding will not occur. An allowable load based on 
ultimate criteria is the maximum load at which structural failure will not occur. If 
configuration-specific tests are used to determine allowable load, test data must be 
corrected to minimum dimensions and minimum material allowable properties. 
Catastrophic Hazard:  The presence of a potential risk situation caused by an unsafe 
condition that can result in a disabling or fatal personnel injury, or loss of one of the 
following: launch or servicing vehicle, International Space Station (ISS), or major ground 
facility. 
Component:  A hardware item that is considered as a single structural entity. The terms 
“component” and “part” are interchangeable in this document. 
Credible Single Barrier Failure:  Potential leaks within a component that permits fluid to 
directly contact the materials behind the barrier or expose secondary compartments to 
system pressure conditions. 
Creep:  A time-dependent deformation under load and thermal environments which 
results in cumulative permanent deformation. 
Critical:  The extreme value of a load or stress; the combination of loads causing the 
maximum stress in a structural member; or the most severe environmental condition 
imposed on a structure during its service life. The design of the structure is based on an 
appropriate combination of such critical loads, stresses, and conditions. 
Critical Seals:  A critical seal is one through which leakage would constitute a 
catastrophic or critical failure. Seals through which atmosphere of any habitable volume 
may leak to the external environment are critical seals. Seals through which flow may 
intrude into the spacecraft during atmospheric entry are critical seals. 
Design Condition:  A condition important in structural design and which may involve a 
specific point in time or integrated effects over a period of time in terms of physical units 
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such as pressure, temperature, load, acceleration, attitude, rate, flux, etc. (See 
Condition) 
Deterministic:  Denotes that values used in design are discrete and not random. 
Deterministic values are determined on the basis of available information and 
experience. (See Probabilistic) 
Detrimental Deformation:
a) Causes unintentional contact, misalignment, or divergence between adjacent 
components 
  Structural deformation, deflection, or displacement which: 
b) Causes significant internal load redistribution in a structure  
c) Causes a component to exceed the dynamic space envelop established for that 
component 
d) Reduces the strength or rated life of the structure below specified levels 
e) Degrades the effectiveness of thermal protection coatings or shields 
f) Jeopardizes the proper functioning of equipment;  
g) Endangers personnel 
h) Degrades the aerodynamic or functional characteristics of the vehicle  
i) Reduces confidence below acceptable levels in the ability to ensure flight-
worthiness by use of established analytical or test techniques 
j) Induces leakage above specified rates 
Development Test:  Any test that provides data needed to reduce risk, to define or 
mature requirements, to design hardware or software, to define manufacturing 
processes, to define qualification or acceptance test procedures, or to investigate 
anomalies discovered during test or operations. 
Discontinuity Area:  A local region of a composite or non-metallic structure consisting of 
built-up plies chopped fiber or reinforced regions around fittings, joints or interfaces 
where the stress state and load distribution within the region may be difficult to 
characterize. A region is considered a discontinuity area until uniform section properties 
in the structure can be considered in the structural analysis. Bonded joints are 
considered discontinuities. 
Element:  Physical entities that have functional capabilities allocated to them necessary 
to satisfy System-level mission objectives. Elements can perform all allocated functions 
within a mission phase, or through mated operations.  
Environmental Correction Factor (ECF):  An adjustment factor used to account for 
differences in the environment (thermal and chemical) in which the part is used and the 
environment in which it is tested. 
𝐸𝐶𝐹 = 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
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Factor of Safety (FS):  Multiplying factors to be applied to limit loads or stresses for 
purposes of analytical assessment (design factors) or test verification (test factors) of 
design adequacy in strength or stability. Factors of safety are deterministically-based 
and are necessary to assure no failures due to uncertainties that result from the design 
process, manufacturing process, and the loading environment 
Failure:  A rupture, collapse, or seizure; an excessive wear; or any other phenomenon 
resulting in the inability of a structure to sustain required loads, pressures, and 
environments. 
Fatigue:  The cumulative irreversible damage in materials and structures incurred by the 
cyclic application of loads and environments. Fatigue is usually considered as the 
number of cycles to crack initiation or to failure.   
Fatigue, Low-Cycle:  A low-frequency, high-amplitude loading condition created by 
thermal, pressure, or structural loads that can propagate flaws to failure. An example of 
a low-cycle loading condition is the aerothermal loading of a turbine blade during 
launch. 
Fatigue, High-Cycle:  A high-frequency, low-amplitude loading condition created by 
structural, acoustic, or aerodynamic vibrations that can propagate flaws to failure. An 
example of a high-cycle fatigue loading condition is the vibration loading of a turbine 
blade due to structural resonance. 
Fitting:  A part or terminal used to join one structural member to another. 
Flight Vehicle:  A vehicle, which is generally composed of multiple elements, used to 
transport persons or things to a location outside of the Earth's atmosphere. 
Habitable Module:  A pressurized, life-supporting enclosure or module that is normally 
intended to support life without the need for spacesuits or special breathing apparatus. 
The enclosure may be one that is continuously inhabited, or one that is used for crew 
transference, or for crew accessible stowage so long as life support is a requirement for 
the design. Single mission or multi-mission module designs are included. 
Limit Load:  The maximum load expected on the structure during its service life 
including ground handling, transport to and from orbit including abort conditions, and on-
orbit operations. 
Load Spectrum:  A representative distribution with respect to time of the cumulative 
static and dynamic loadings anticipated for a structural component or assembly under 
all expected operating environments. 
Margin of Safety (MS):
1
stress appliedlimit   ultimate)or  (yield FS
ultimate)or(yieldstressallowable
−
×
=MS
  The parameter utilized by the structural discipline to express 
structural capability in terms of structural requirements which include factor of safety. 
Margins of safety are expressed for both yield and ultimate criteria. The basic equation 
defining margin of safety for uniaxial stress (which does not apply for combined 
stresses) is:  
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Math Model, Structural:  The mathematical equations, boundary values, initial 
conditions, and modeling data needed to describe the conceptual model of a structure. 
Maximum Design Pressure (MDP):  The Maximum Design Pressure (MDP) for a 
pressurized system is the highest pressure defined by the maximum relief pressure, 
maximum regulator pressure, maximum temperature and transient pressure excursions 
based on two credible system failures. 
Maximum Design Speed (MDS):  The highest possible operating speed based on a 
combination of credible failures; critical equipment must consider two credible failures. 
Certain liquid propulsion system engines will not meet this definition. 
Maximum Expected Operating Pressure (MEOP):  The maximum pressure which the 
pressurized hardware is expected to experience during its service life, in association 
with its applicable operating environments. 
Mission:  A flight to a destination in space, intended to accomplish specific scientific and 
technical objectives.  
Negative Pressure Differential: The Maximum External Pressure (MEP) multiplied by 
the ultimate factor of safety. 
Non-Safety Critical Structures:  Structures which if they fail will not create a catastrophic 
hazard. 
Pressure Vessel:
a) Contains stored energy of 19,307 joules (14,240 foot-pounds) or greater based 
on adiabatic expansion of a perfect gas; or 
  A container designed primarily for pressurized storage of gases or 
liquids and: 
b) Contains a gas or liquid in excess of 103.4 kPa (15 psia) which will create a 
hazard if released; or 
c) Stores a gas which will experience a MDP greater than 689.5 kPa (100 psi). 
Pressurized Hardware:  Any hardware item that is exposed to and largely structurally 
designed to carry acting pressure, such as pressure vessels, other pressurized 
components such as lines, fittings, valves, and bellows, and pressurized structures and 
habitable modules. 
Pressurized Structure:  A structure designed to carry vehicle loads in which pressure is 
a significant contributor to the design loads. Pressurized structures are typically large 
tanks or habitable structures that carry external flight loads as well as containing the 
internal fluids or gases.   
Pressurized System:  A system that consists of pressure vessels, pressurized 
structures, or both, and other pressure components such as lines, fittings, valves, and 
bellows that are exposed to and structurally designed largely to carry or store 
pressurized gases or liquids. Not included are electrical or other control devices 
required for system operation. 
Preloaded Joint:  A preloaded joint is a joint in which the preload is necessary to have 
adequate life due to cyclic loads, or to assure that no joint separation and resulting 
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stiffness change occurs, or to assure that no joint separation occurs which would affect 
pressure seals. 
Probabilistic:  Denotes that the values used in design are random, not discrete. 
Probabilistic values are chosen on the basis of statistical inference. (See Deterministic.) 
Proof Load or Pressure:  The product of the limit load or pressure and the proof factor. 
Proof Test:  A load or pressure in excess of limit load or maximum design pressure 
applied in order to verify the structural integrity of a part or to screen initial flaws in a 
part. 
Prototype Structure:  A separate flight-like structural test article used in a test program 
to verify structural integrity of the design. Prototype tests and qualification tests are 
synonymous. 
Protoflight Structure :  Flight hardware utilized for ground qualification testing in lieu of a 
dedicated test article. The approach includes the use of reduced test levels and/or 
durations and post-test hardware refurbishment where required. 
Qualification Test:  Formal test conducted with defined qualification margin as part of 
the certification program to qualify a design, manufacturing process, and acceptance 
testing program to produce equipment able to accomplish the full range of performance 
requirements in all predicted service life environments. 
Random Vibration:  The non-deterministic oscillatory response of a structure caused by 
acoustical and/or mechanical forcing functions. The magnitude and spectral content of 
random vibration is known only in terms of statistical average properties.  
Rotating Machinery:  Devices with spinning parts such as fans, centrifuges, motors, 
pumps, gyros and flywheels. 
Safety Critical:  An event, system, subsystem or process that if lost or degraded, would 
result in a critical or catastrophic hazard. 
Service Life:  The service interval for a part beginning with manufacture and extending 
through its planned and specified usage. The service life includes all loadings and 
environments encountered during this period including manufacturing, testing, 
transportation, launch, on-orbit, descent, landing, and post landing events. A “service 
life” is sometimes referred to as a “lifetime.” In this sense, “lifetime” means a specified 
life as opposed to an analytically predicted life 
Service Life Factor (Life Factor):   A multiplying factor to be applied to the maximum 
expected number of load cycles in the service life to determine the design adequacy in 
fatigue or fracture. 
Soft Goods:  Cloth, fabric and articles made of cloth or fabric. 
Spacecraft:  A self-contained vehicle or system that is developed to operate in space or 
planetary body. A spacecraft consists of a support structure onto which are attached 
scientific instruments and related systems for communication, power, propulsion, and 
control. 
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Spaceflight Hardware:  All flight hardware including launch vehicle, spacecraft and, 
payloads.  
Static Load:  A load of constant magnitude and direction with respect to the structure. 
Stiffness:  Structural resistance as a function of deflection or rotation under an applied 
force or torque. 
Strength, Material:  The stress level that a material is capable of withstanding in a local 
structural configuration and expected operating environments. Units are expressed in 
force per unit area using the original dimensions of the unloaded section. 
Strength, Ultimate:  Corresponds to the maximum load or stress that a structure or 
material can withstand without incurring rupture or collapse. 
Strength, Yield:  Corresponds to the maximum load or stress that a structure or material 
can withstand without incurring permanent deformation. 
Stress, Allowable:  The maximum stress that can be permitted in a material for a given 
design condition to prevent rupture/collapse for ultimate conditions or detrimental 
deformation for yield conditions. 
Stress, Applied:  The stress induced by applied loads and thermal gradients. 
Stress, Limit:  The maximum stress expected in the structure during its service life 
including ground handling, transport to and from orbit including abort conditions, and on-
orbit operations. 
Stress, Thermal:  The stress from temperature gradients and differential thermal 
expansion between structural components, assemblies, or systems. 
Structural Adequacy or Integrity:  A structure that complies with correctly specified 
design requirements. 
Structural Design Temperatures:  Temperature distributions of the structure when it is 
subjected to critical combinations of loads, pressures, and temperatures. 
Structural Fastener:  A fastener used in either the primary or secondary load path of a 
structure. 
Structural Seal:  A structural seal is one which is mounted in a static structural interface 
and prevents air flow from a high-pressure area to a lower pressure area. 
Structural Thermal Effects:  Thermal effects on the structure include heat transfer rates, 
temperature levels and cycles, thermal stresses and deformations, and mechanical and 
physical property changes. 
Structure:  All components and assemblies designed to sustain loads or pressures, 
provide stiffness and stability, or provide support or containment. 
Structure, Primary:  That part of a flight vehicle or element which sustains the significant 
applied loads and provides main load paths for distributing reactions to applied loads. 
Also the main structure which is required to sustain the significant applied loads, 
including pressure and thermal loads, and which if it fails creates a catastrophic hazard. 
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If a component is small enough and in an environment where no serious threat is 
imposed if it breaks, then it is not primary structure. 
Structure, Secondary:  The internal or external structure which is used to attach small 
components, provide storage, and to make either an internal volume or external surface 
usable. Secondary structure attaches to and is supported by primary structure.  
Tailoring:  Adapting existing requirements to specific program or project needs. 
Ultimate Load, Pressure, or Stress:  Ultimate Load, Pressure, or Stress  -  The 
maximum load, pressure, or stress that a structure should withstand without incurring 
rupture or collapse; also, the product of the limit load multiplied by the ultimate FS. (Also 
Ultimate Strength.) 
Verification:  A formal process, using the method of test, analysis, inspection or 
demonstration, to confirm that a system and its components satisfy all specified 
performance and operational requirements 
Vibration Mode:  A characteristic pattern of displacement assumed by a vibrating 
system in which the motion of every particle is simple harmonic with the same 
frequency. Also referred to as Elastic Mode. 
Yield Load, Pressure, or Stress:  The maximum load, pressure, or stress that a structure 
can withstand without incurring detrimental deformations; analytically, the maximum 
load that a structure can withstand without exceeding the yield stress of the material; 
also the product of the limit load multiplied by the yield FS. (Also Yield Strength) 
